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Senin, 27 Maret 2017

The AHCA is dead, but Trump could still kill the ACA


Today’s Managing Health Care Costs Number is Six



We can spend the weekend celebrating the failure of Congressional Republicans to repeal and replace Obamacare.   The American Health Care Act was ill-conceived, would have led to loss of insurance for 24 million, and would have led to higher health care costs and less meaningful health insurance coverage for additional millions – and it is dead.  For now.

But the opportunity to damage the Affordable Care Act remains. 

Salonhas an insightful piece today about how the Republicans have been undermining the ACA since it was passed.  Marco Rubio and others slipped a provision into a budget bill that gutted risk corridor payments to health plans that lost money in the ACA’s early years, when actuaries lacked enough claims to make good estimates of projected costs.   The federal government owed insurers $2.9 million, but only paid out $400,000.   This was a major reason for the failure of the COOP plans, and a lawsuit on this was dismissed last week.

There are many other ways that the Trump Administration can undermine the Affordable Care Act, and help fulfill Donald Trump’s predictions about the ACA “imploding” or “exploding.”   Today, I’ll focus on what the administration can do to undermine the law – and in a future post I’ll talk more about what it could do to make the law work better.  

1.      Stop paying insurance plans for the “cost reduction subsidy,” the CSR.   The ACA limits out of pocket spending for individuals at under 250% of the federal poverty limit, and the federal government writes a check to health plans to cover this expense.   The expense is not factored into premium costs.  But the House Republicans sued the Obama Administration - asserting that it could only pay these funds if they were appropriated.    A district court found for the House, and the Obama Administration lodged an appeal.   The Trump administration and Paul Ryan have asked the Appeals Court to delay hearing the case.  If the Trump Administration decides not to defend against this suit and to renege on payment to health plans – we’re going to see a mass exodus of insurers from the ACA marketplaces.

Source:



2.       Not enforce the employer mandate
One of the biggest impacts of the ACA was that it set standards for “minimum essential coverage,” and employers had to meet those standards or would be subject to penalties. These penalties were delayed by the Obama Administration (although it’s not clear they had the authority to do so.)  But there has been widespread belief that employers that did offer the ten essential benefits as required by each state, or had premiums that were unaffordable for their employees, would have to pay a penalty someday.  If it’s clear there will never be a penalty, we could lose many of the benefits of a national standard for employer sponsored health insurance.

3.      Not enforce the individual mandate
We need to have healthy people in the insurance pool, because insurance is wealth transfer from the healthy to the sick.   Many healthy people (yup – guys in their 20s) feel invincible – so there has to be some “stick” to encourage them to sign up for (and pay for) health insurance.   Hence the reviled mandate.  The Trump administration has already instructed the IRS not to collect data from individuals documenting health coverage.   Further moves to telegraph that the requirement is dead could help make all of the “death spiral” talk a reality. 

4.      Give states Medicaid waivers that allow them to sharply diminish the numbers of those covered, or the quality of the coverage.  Medicaid is the most cost effective way to cover the poor – and is far less expensive than commercial insurance, generally due to low provider fees.   States have asked for waivers to require work, to require more cost sharing, and to require more bureaucracy.   These efforts will push many away from Medicaid – which will lead to worse health outcomes and expose providers to bad debt.

5.      Cancel marketing plans.   The Affordable Care Act works to reduce uninsurance when there is aggressive marketing. The Trump Administration pulled ads at the end of the last enrollment period, and when they pulled ads, enrollment dropped.  The ACA only succeeds with robust enrollment.  It won’t work if the ACA is a closely guarded secret.

6.      Abandon payment reform.  Let’s face it- the real problem with the ACA is that health care is too expensive.  I don’t believe for a minute that payment reform will by itself cure our health care cost problem.  But I believe that aggressive experimentation with different payment models can help drive clinical transformation.  Medicare is a critical player in payment reform, and the efforts of CMS and CMMI (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation) have helped foment substantial payment reform on the commercial side.  However, if providers generally think that the Tom Price HHS doesn’t care for any payment reform, we could see a substantial drop in provider ACO activity.  Providers who continue to do what they have historically done are not going to help us control health care costs.  

It was easy for the Republicans to vociferously oppose the Affordable Care Act, but hard for them to agree on a meaningful alternative.   It was easier for the Democrats to oppose the poorly-drafted AHCA, and will be harder for them to push the executive branch to do effective rule-making and enforcement now that Ryan and Trump have agreed that the ACA is the "law of the land."


Additional sources for this post are articles by Margot Katz-Sanger of the New York Times, Anna Maria Barry-Jester of 538.comand Adam Cancryn and others of Politico.

Image (C) cmfu via Flickr Creative Common License  

Senin, 06 Maret 2017

 Doubts on payment reform could stall health care transformation

Doubts on payment reform could stall health care transformation


Payment reform on its own will not cure our high medical costs.  We need to make fundamental changes in the way we deliver care - and that won't happen just because some care is no longer paid for via "fee for service."  

Changes that we need include:
  • Advancing "disruptive innovations," that lower costs dramatically even if they lack some elements of traditional care. (This includes midwifery delivery in birth centers for low risk pregnancy, and lightweight ultrasounds that can be used at the point of care)
  • Increased coordination among providers
  • Better "hot spotting" to identify the highest risk patients and prevent hospital admissions
  • Evidence based use of imaging
  • Providers who are sensitive to resource cost of what they order

Right now, health care providers are doing well overall - and changing the underlying business is a threat to that success.   Payment reform provides the necessary threat to push integrated delivery networks and other provider organizations to seriously consider making changes that could lower revenue. 

So while payment reform alone won't lead to higher value care, lack of the viable threat of payment reform could halt progress on health care delivery redesign.   Why should a CFO agree to an expensive program to halt high margin but preventable hospital admissions?

I co-teach a provider payment course in a graduate degree program for mid-career physician executives at the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health. Watching these talented physicians and learning about the efforts they are making to transform health care in their organizations has made me guardedly optimistic about the chances that the "accountable care" movement could substantially improve health care value.

This weekend, the buzz was around a comment by one of the professors that "MACRA is dead."   MACRA, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act, which eliminated the physician "sustainable growth rate (SGR)" regulations which would have cut Medicare professional reimbursement by more than a quarter, defined specific Medicare penalties for providers who were not effectively using electronic medical records, and allowed physicians participating in alternative payment models to avoid these penalties.

MACRA was passed by a bipartisan majority in 2015 (54-45 in the Senate and 392-37 in the House).  So some have felt that the payment reform in MACRA is "safe."   I'm afraid I disagree.

MACRA had the support of many conservative Republicans who voted for this in part because it eliminated the hated SGR. Many, including now-HHS Secretary Tom Price, have argued that the Obama Administration rulemaking around the bill would create undue demands on physicians.  Price argued that payment reform should be voluntary.    But voluntary bundled payments don't create the burning platform necessary to drive change in health care delivery.

Some delivery systems that have been deeply committed to transforming themselves will push ahead with efforts to improve quality of care and lower costs.  But many systems are likely to put such efforts on the slow track, as they wait to see whether the Trump administration will do the hard work of administrative rulemaking to support payment reform.

As we discussed the prospects for payment reform, I sensed a deep sigh of disappointment among these physician executives who have devoted their professional lives to redesigning health care.

Senin, 27 Februari 2017

Adjusting risk adjustment


Source   Note that I find the legend a bit confusing. The purple areas are the ones with highest diagnostic intensity, and would have lower Medicare Advantage reimbursement if that was taken into account

"I take care of the sickest patients" is what all physicians say if it appears that their utilization or costs are out of line with colleagues.  Sometimes, that's true.  But all physicians can't have above-average illness burdens in their patient populations any more than all children in Lake Wobegon can be above average.

There were two interesting articles on risk adjustment last week.

The first is a wonky Perspective piece in the New England Journalevaluating the impact of "diagnostic intensity" on apparent risk adjustment. The simple translation of this is "doctors who are more aggressive in their diagnostic coding 'trick' the risk adjustment software into assigning their patients higher risk." 

The researchers looked at diagnostic intensity by MSA, evaluating how diagnostic intensity changed when Medicare beneficiaries moved.  It's ingenious - and the research showed that while the doctors in McAllen Texas appear to have patients that are 25% higher risk than those of El Paso based on their coding, that would decrease to a 15% differential if their aggressive coding is neutralized.  

The places where diagnostic intensity is especially high:  The northeast, the south, and some metropolitan areas of California.  Florida, Texas, SoCal and Metro New York have the highest amount of apparent diagnostic upcoding.

The researchers state:
…patients who live in areas of the country where providers tend to diagnose more aggressively will be measured as being sicker than patients who are actually similarly healthy but live in areas with less intensive diagnostic practices. Payments and performance measures will therefore be tilted to favor providers in more diagnostic-intensive regions.

The gist.  We need to adjust risk adjustment!

Medicare completed phasing in risk adjustment for all Medicare Advantage plans in 2007. CMS recognized that there would be "diagnostic creep," so all risk adjustment is calculated on a cost-neutral basis.  If some provider organizations code aggressively and are paid more, those provider organizations that don't code aggressively will be penalized by being paid less.

It's no surprise that health plans worked hard to get their providers to fully code for all possible diagnoses so that the health plans would get the highest possible CMS revenue for their Medicare Advantage populations.  Just google "risk adjustment Medicare" and you'll be shocked at how many vendor ads pop up.   Some health plans even sent providers to patient homes to assess them - and to pile on any possible diagnoses that would increase revenue yield. 

The US has joined a whistleblower lawsuit against United Health Care (initially filed in 2011) saying that it received hundreds of millions of dollars in excessive reimbursement due to "'upcoding' the risk adjustment claims by fraudulently documenting diagnoses that members didn’t have or did not receive treatment for during the eligible period." 

United isn't the only defendant in this lawsuit. Modern Health Care reports that at least 9 other health plans are also named; the Department of Justice only joined the lawsuit against UHC and a company it acquired.  I'd say that if there was fraud, the victims were other health plans that had their reimbursement cut- as CMS makes all risk adjustment payments cost neutral.

Risk adjustment is critical - some providers DO take care of sicker patients.  However, any risk adjustment system is can be gamed- and we'd like to be sure that providers (and health plans) spend more energy on taking genuinely great care of the sick people, as opposed to spending the majority of their effort at achieving higher revenue through aggressive coding.

Senin, 14 November 2016

Medicare to start cardiac bundles


Today’s Managing Health Care Costs Number is $200 billion


Interquartile cost variation, 2005 

Source: Health Services Research, (2010)

A post with (almost) no reference to the 2016 Presidential election follows.

This week’s JAMA has a review of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services plan to move to 90 day bundled payment for heart attacks and bypass surgery.  Medicare pays $200 billion annually for this care.

The plan will go into effect in July, 2017 – and budgets will initially be determined by historical hospital costs.  However, in 2020 the budgets will instead by based on regional expenses – which could mean high-cost hospitals will face a substantial pay cut.

The program offers a single payment to the hospital, which would pay affiliated physicians.  Readmissions (in the first 90 days) would be included –and all results would be risk adjusted.   Hospitals would only be eligible for bonus payments if they met quality standards.

Virtually all of the projected cost savings from this program, which would roll out to 98 randomly selected metropolitan areas, would come in the final years when hospitals will have a larger risk corridor and be judged based on regional rather than hospital-specific results.

There’s a lot of promise here

1)     Cardiac care and cardiac surgery is well standardized – there is not massive disagreement about what care is “best.”
2)     A previous Medicare bundled payment program for cardiac surgery was highly successful.  This was the only payment reform program that the CBO judged a success, although it has never been replicated or expanded
3)     There is a huge amount of variation between the higher and the lower cost facilities, which is not definitively related to quality.
4)     The bundles are hospital –centric, as opposed to many other episodes where a substantial portion of the cost is ambulatory
5)     The program will be implemented in randomly chosen areas – allowing for high quality studies to determine efficacy
6)     There is substantial volume and money here – so if value of care is improved many patients will benefit and much money can be saved.

But there will be objections.    Physicians who are not employed by hospitals are worried about hospitals controlling professional reimbursements.    Academic medical centers with high historic costs will be justifiably worried, and will lobby for a longer phase in period for regional budgets.   Or they will argue against the program altogether.  This payment reform is related to MACRA(The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015) rather than to the Affordable Care Act. 

(OK – so this is not totally without a glancing reference to the elections).